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The Challenge of a New Era in World Trade 
Next Monday in Washington the Congress will begin hearings on 
a crucially important legislative proposal that is designed to keep 
this Nation moving ahead -- strong and prosperous -- in an 
increasingly competitive world. I refer to President Kennedy 1 s 
sweeping new trade program. 
The overriding aim of that proposal is to bring the United 
States into step with the dynamic new era in world trade that opened 
less than ten years ago with the formation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community. Soon after, six European nations agreed to remove 
trade barriers and foster economic and political cooperation between 
them within a Common Market. That brilliant experiment, which rode 
the wave of European expansion, has been fabulously successful --
and its success has created a major challenge for the United States 
States. 
The challenge is simply this: are we going to compete with the 
Common Market on equal terms or are we going to step aside because 
we are afraid to compete? 
In making our decision, we must bear in mind that the Common 
Market will profoundly influence trade among all free nations. We 
should also bear in mind that our decision to compete or to step 
aside will have far-reaching consequences -- not only for the 
United States and the Common Market countries, but for every free 
nation, developed or developing, with a stake in world trade. 
Our decision may well determine whether the free world of the 
future will be a close-knit, cooperative alliance of thriving 
nations, or a loose coalition of trading blocs, each with its ovm 
economic interests, and each a potential political rival of the 
,others • 
. President Kennedy has clearly charted the direction we should 
take. He has called upon the Congress to replace the old 
Reciprocal Trade Act -- which has been extended eleven times in 
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of freer trade, it must be a world in which decisions~to invest at 
home or abroad are not based on tax incentives, but on genuine 
economic factors. Although we cannot change foreign tax laws, we 
can,if we wish, see to it that American capital is taxed in similar 
fashion wherever it may be.· This does not mean that we look with 
disfavor on foreign investment -- provia'e'a it is based on economic 
considerations, rather than tax favoritism which discriminates 
against investment at home. We propose, of course, to leave 
intact the present tax advantage· for investment in underdeveloP,ed 
nations. This is appropriate because such investment not only 
involves a greater risk, but because it also serves a vital purpose 
in adding to the potential"economic strength of the free world. 
In addition to our tax and trade. policies, we are employing 
other measures to expand exports. One deserves particular mention. 
It is a new program of insurance against both commercial and 
political risks in export trade which was recently begun by the 
Export-Import Bank in cooperation with fifty-seven private insurance. 
companies. This program offers our exporters for the first time 
insurance comparable to that available to their.European and 
Japanese competitors. 
Recent and proposed export promotion measures should begin to 
show results sometime this yeftr -- although their full impact may 
not be felt for two years or more. Such measures cannot succeed, 
however, if American products must surmount a barrier of high 
tariffs abroad. This is why President Kennedy has asked Congress 
to give him the authority to negotiate effective tariff reductions 
and allow•our goods to enter foreign markets on a competitive 
basis. 
But negotiating is a two-way street, and the President must have 
the power to lower our tariffs as well. At present he has authority 
only to negotiate for one item at a time -- bargaining the wall down 
brick by brick. This slow process will not work with the Common 
Market, which has already reduced its internal tariffs about forty 
percent and is moving ahead of schedule. We can't keep pace under 
the present authority. 
This was made clear in the announcement yesterday by President 
Kennedy of the conclusion of tariff negotiations with the Common 
Market and 25 other countries at Geneva. Largely because of the 
difficulties imposed by our current law, those negotiations were 
extraordinarily complex, and it is no exaggeration to say that they 
used up all the available authority given to the President under our 
present legislation . 
. We achieved agreement stabilizing or reducing tariffs on $4.3 
billion a year in export items, whereas our concessions covered only 
$2.9 billion in imports. The agreements, although excellent, are 
only a start of really effective action to take advantage of the 
opportunity of this expanding market. If we are ever to seize this 
opportunity, we must give our negotiators real power to bargain. 
Without it they are helpless to protect the vital interests of our 
farmers and businessmen in the negotiations ahead. 
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Finally, negotiations ta~e time -- the last round took 17 
months -- and there is always a delay before the agreements become 
effective. If we are to make significant pro~ress, we cannot afford 
to lose time. It is important to provide a new trade program --
and it is also important to provide it without delay. President 
Kennedy's new trade proposal will give him authority to bargain 
for whole groups of products at once. Only in that way can effec-
tive tariff reduction be negotiated with the Common Market. 
The time for decision is running out. So far, our role as a 
supplier and customer of the Common Market has been steadily 
picking up momentum. But the potential for progress, prosperity,· 
and growth, dammed up behind internal European trade harriers, 1s 
being let loose as those b.arriers are taken down, and the result is 
a tqrrent of trade between the Market countries. For example, 
West German trade with the other five Common Market countries rose 
last year about twice as fast as her total foreign trade. We must 
. act promptly to demonstrate to Europe that we intend to take an 
active part in the new trade era. Prolonged inaction -- or 
inadequate authority -- could defeat this purpose. 
Since it came into being almost five years ago, the Common 
Market has grown, -- in terms of gross national product -- at 
roughly twice the rate of the United States. With the proposed 
addition of the United Kingdom and other full and associate members, 
it would have a population substantially larger than ours, with an 
economy which would also rival ours. Equally important, it would 
have -- in time -- a single external tariff barrier, just as we do. 
The profit potential for us in the Common Market is clear. 
European highways are jammed with shiny new cars, luxury shops 
are crowded with eager customers, new stores are constantly opening 
their doors. These are all signs -- so common in America -- of a 
high-income, high-consumption economy. Thousands of familiar U.S. 
products are unknown in Europe, and even though Europe's shop-
windows are well-stocked, they can hold a great deal more. For 
American manufacturers the development of this new Europe could be 
a bonanza. 
One of the most frequent arguments in opposition to the trade 
program is that lowering our tariff barriers would open us to a 
flood of low-wage foreign competition that would damage our domestic 
industries. 
No one, of course, can rule out the possibility of some damage 
to domestic industry. Such d~mage as might occur, however, would 
be limited to a relatively small proportion of our overall economy. 
While some individual companies might suffer, there is no evidence 
to support any prediction of economic damage to our economy as 
a whole. To assist the adjustment of industries and localities to 
whatever harmful competition might develop, President Kennedy has 
proposed a trade adjustment program. It will also provide, 
wherever necessary, for retraining workers for new jobs. A similar 
program inside the Common Market has proved highly successful in 
smoothing over the rough spots that have developed as the member 
countries moved toward complete free trade among themselves. 
... 
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Here are some facts to be considered in evaluating the threat 
of low-wage foreign oompetition: 
-- Our high-wage industries usuaily do much better in export 
markets -- and suffer less in import markets -- than our low-wage 
industries. 
-- Despite the fact that our wage rates in many cases are 
double or triple those of our competitors, the United States exports 
much more to foreign markets than any other nation. 
--·We sell far more abroad than other countries sell to us. 
Last year our trade surplus, excluding aid-financed exports, totaled $3 billion. 
' 
-- About sixty percent of our present imports do not compete 
with domestic goods, either because they are products we do not 
produce. ~in this country, or at least do not produce in any 
significant quantity. 
-- And finally, it is not unit wage cost, but overall unit cost 
that is important in determining competitive prices •. An American 
coal miner, for instance, is paid eight times as much as a Japanese 
miner, but we·still sell tens of millions of dollars worth of coal 
to Japan every.year. Part of the explanation is that the American 
miner produces coal about fourteen times faster than his Japanese 
counterpart, so our overall unit cost is smaller. 
While the fact that foreig~ wages are lower than ours does not 
in itself make foreign manufacturers more competitive than our own --
and while· considerable pressure is building up to drive foreign 
wages higher -- this does not mean that we can afford to ignore the 
importance of our own wage-price structure. On the contrary, our 
wages and prices are all-important in determining our competitive 
position against foreign producers, both in domestic and overseas 
markets. 
From 1955 to 1957, for instance, U.S. wages and prices in a 
few key exporting industries rose substantially in relation to those 
in Europe, and during that period, our share of world exports of • 
those conunodities fell sharply. 
Wage-price inflation at home must be avoided at all costs. 
Such inflation would create serious trouble for our manufacturers 
in competing against foreign producers both at home and abroad. 
The beneficial effect of imports on our economy is often over-
looked. Many of our important industries are dependent upon 
imports for raw materials. We must, for instance, import ninety 
percent of our manganese or chrome ore -- essential products in 
steel production. 
( -
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One has only to look at the new market in compact cars to 
appreciate how much scope there is for a constructive response to 
import competition. Furthermore, recent factory shipments of 
U.S.-made small transistor radios have doubled, as we began to take 
advantage of a domestic market created by Japanese imports. At 
first the imports far outnumbered domestic production, but our own 
manufacturers quickly improved production methods and increased. 
production when they saw the ma.rket potential. The result.ing drop 
in unit cost, thanks to increased efficiency, made the difference, 
despite the lower wages in Japan. · 
The trade program offers a challenge -- not a threat. This 
is particularly true in the matter of jobs .. One out of every 
eight farm workers produces for export:,,' and nearly eight percent 
of the employment in manufacturing.is attributable to exports. 
In all, more than three million workers owe their jobs --
directly or indirectly -- to exports, many more than the small 
fraction of all workers who might be adversely affected by a rise 
in imports. Failure to enact the trade program would seriously 
affect these export workers, by making it more difficult to seal 
goods in Europe. 
The President's Trade Program is not an isolated, one-shot 
proposal, but a strong commitment to a new era in economic 
cooperation among all free nations. It has political, as well as 
economic implications, for trade is a means to stay in touch with 
other nations on a basis of mutual interest arising from mutual 
advantage. The trade program is not merely a device to deal with 
the Common Market, but an avenue of cooperation for all free 
nations. Trade with the Common Market will stimulate both our own 
growth and that of our allies in Western Europe -- thereby expanding 
their capacity to assume an increasing share of the common defense 
of freedom. If freedom is to survive, the free nations must be · 
united as closely as possible in pursuit of our common purpose. 
The President's Trade Program is a major means of achieving 
ever closer cooperation and economic strength. Without it, our 
immediate outlook is uncertain. With it, we are a step closer to 
our goal of a free world of thriving, prosperous and strong nations. 
Let us reject economic insularity as we rejected political insularity. 
Let us decide now, while there is time, that we will not let this 
opportunity pass. Let us seize it boldly, in the best tradition 
of a people who welcome change and challenge and who willingly 
face up to competition. 
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